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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to exemplify how to solve  the problem of selecting a candidate 
up to his/her acceptance trough game theory. The originality this paper proposes is how 
this problem will be approached: it will be treated as a single game which is made up of 
two parts, going as far as to state that the payoffs in the first part of the game will be the 
mediators of the second part of the game.  
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1        INTRODUCTION 
A presidential decree reduced the number of candidates to the vice-presidency to three 
people. Each of the three candidates are ranked on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 
(highest).The presidential board attributed 10 points, 8 points and 5 points to the candidate 
classified in 1st place, 2nd place and 3rd place, respectively. The probabilities  candidate 
i (i=1,2,3) accepting the j-th offer to run for the vice-presidency have been defined, 
considering that the first j-1 offers to the others have been declined, are denoted by 𝑝𝑖𝑗 
and the respective values are in Table 1. 
 
                                                  Table 1 Acceptance Probabilities 
 
       Player 1            𝒑𝟏𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟓           𝒑𝟏𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟐           𝒑𝟏𝟑 = 𝟎. 𝟎 
       Player 2            𝒑𝟐𝟏 = 𝟎. 𝟗           𝒑𝟐𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟓           𝒑𝟐𝟑 = 𝟎. 𝟐 
       Player 3            𝒑𝟑𝟏 = 𝟏. 𝟎           𝒑𝟑𝟐 = 𝟎. 𝟖           𝒑𝟑𝟑 = 𝟎. 𝟒 
 
The question is: 
-What is the order in which the three potential candidates be offered the vice-presidential 
nomination if the presidential decree imposes the expected number of points 
maximization, supposing that no candidate is requested more than once and, each time 
a candidate rejects, another one is requested, until at least one has accepted or all have 
rejected. 
 
2        GAME DETAILS 
This game which is made up of two parts – a selection process and an acceptance process 
– attests that the payoffs in the first part of the game (potential candidates) will be the 
intermediaries of the second (decision elements).Thus: 
 
Players: 
Candidate classified in 1st place –1; 
Candidate classified in 2nd place – 2; 
Candidate classified in 3rd place – 3. 
Presidential Board-4 
 
Strategies1 : 
Potential Candidates:  
The strategy of each potential candidate is to accept the offer – A - or to reject the offer - 
R. 
Presidential Board:  
The presidential board wants to establish the order in which the potential candidates will 
be invited to maximize the expected number of points. In this way the strategy for the 
presidential board will be the order in which the three potential candidates can be offered 
the vice-presidential nomination until at least one has accepted or all have rejected the 
offer - P. 
 
Payoffs: 
Presidential Board:  
The presidential board payoff is the expected number of points of each possibility in the 
order of the proposal presented to the potential candidates.  
Potential Candidates:  
For these players it is possible to define: if the player accepts the offer, he/she gets the 
"total prize", that is, he/she gets payoff 1. On the other hand, if he/she rejects the proposal, 
he/she does not get anything so his/her payoff will be 0. 
This game is an example of game theory application to human resources management. 
On this subject see also (Andrade et al., 2012), (Ferreira et al., 2008, 2012, 2014, 2016), 
Ferreira (1991, 2014), (Filipe et al, 2012), (Matos and Ferreira, 2005) and (Matos et al., 
2018). 
 
 
3      CODE FORME REPRESENTATION FOR THE GAME 
To represent the game, code form game representation, see (Ferreira and Matos, 2018) 
and (Matos and Ferreira, 2002, 2002a, 2003, 2005), will be used. Code form is a table 
where the strategies, that are available to any player, are codified. The table is built 
containing the whole game information. In Table 2 is the code form representation for the 
game now considered. Reading from left to the right, the first column indicates the period 
number and the second column indicates the move2 number. The following columns 
mention who moves when and in what circumstances and what action is played when 
somebody is called upon to move. Last column indicates the payoffs vector in accordance 
with the strategies chosen by the players. It is easy to check that the order in which the 
                                                          
1 See (Bicchieri et al., 1999). 
2 See (Benoit and Krishna, 1985) and Eberwein (2000). 
three potential candidates can be offered the vice-presidential nomination must be (follow 
symbols in bold):  
-To invite in the first place the candidate classified in 2nd place, 2; if he/she rejects the 
proposal, the candidate classified in third place, 3, should be invited and if he/she does 
not accept, the candidate classified in first place, 1 should be invited.The expected 
number of points is 7.6 =7.2 +0.4+0+0. 
 
                                                 Table 2 Code Form Game 
 
1 1 (4,P)     
1 2  (1,A,0.5)   (5,1,0,0) 
   (1,R,0.5)    
 3   (2,A,0.5)  (2,0,1,0) 
    (2,R,0.5)   
 4    (3,A,0.4) (0.5,0,0,1) 
     (3,R,0.6) (0,0,0,0) 
 3   (3,A,0.8)  (2,0,0,1) 
    (3,R,0.2)   
 4    (2,A,0.2) (0.16,0,1,0) 
     (2,R,0.8) (0,0,0,0) 
 2  (2,A,0.9)   (7.2,0,1,0) 
   (2,R,0.1)    
 3   (1,A,0.2)  (0.2,1,0,0) 
    (1,R,0.8)   
 4    (3,A,0.4) (0.16,0,0,1) 
     (3,R,0.6) (0,0,0,0) 
 3   (3,A,0.8)  (0.4,0,0,1) 
    (3,R,0.2)   
 4    (1,A,0) (0,1,0,0) 
     (1,R,1) (0,0,0,0) 
 2  (3,A,1)   (5,0,0,1) 
   (3,R,0)    
 3   (1,A,0.2)  (0,1,0,0) 
    (1,R,0.8)   
 4    (2,A,0.2) (0,0,1,0) 
     (2,R,0.8) (0,0,0,0) 
 3   (2,A,0.5)  (0,0,1,0) 
    (2,R,0.5)   
 4    (1,A,0) (0,1,0,0) 
     (1,R,1) (0,0,0,0) 
 
Note that the winning strategy (from the Presidential Board point of view) is weak in 
guarantying the existence of a vice-president in the end of the selection process. Indeed, 
if the first two candidates refuse the vice-presidency, it will be vacant since the best-
classified candidate will certainly refuse when asked in third place. 
This is an example of how, when it comes to modelling human behaviour, all criteria 
are debatable and have strengths and weaknesses. You have to be very careful in your 
choice, and the quantitative aspects are not necessarily the most important.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
The analyzed game illustrates that the player who has decision power is not always the 
one who decides the game. In other words, the presidential board is the player who 
dominates the situation; therefore, they decide who the best candidate is. But, indeed, the 
ones who actually decide the game are the potential candidates when either they accept 
or they refuse the proposal. Really, the potential candidates are the ones who determine 
the game’s outcome; starting from a situation of weakness they gain the control of the 
game. They are the result of the first part of the game and become the deciding elements 
of the second part of the game. 
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